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Perceptual Animacy

Perceptual Animacy

\emph{perceptual animacy}, the detection by broadly perceptual processes of animate objects and their targets.

Gao et al, 2009 figure 2

Evidence for the existence of perceptual animacy comes from a variety of studies where adults are given a simple visual task such as identifying which circle is the ‘wolf’ and which the ‘sheep’, or, in another experiment, moving the sheep around in order to avoid being caught by the wolf.
It is also possible to examine how having a sheep and a wolf affects how attention is allocated by measuring how well participants can detect probes placed on different shapes.
The literature on perceptual animacy mostly confounds it with goal tracking. But there are two key differences.
First, perceptual animacy is a broadly perceptual phenomenon.
Second, the perceptual detection of animacy is clearly distinct from goal tracking for it involves detecting relations between objects in motion rather than outcomes to which actions are directed. Relatedly, it does not involve sensitivity to the type of action. And the perceptual detection of animacy appears to depend on simple cues and heuristics and is unlikely to be correctly described by the Teleological Stance. So perceptual animacy does not involve tracking goals to which an action is directed: it is a matter of tracking objects to which animate movements are directed.

Gao et al, 2009 figure 3b

\emph{{perceptual animacy}}, the detection by broadly perceptual processes of animate objects and their targets. To illustrate, consider a groundbreaking experiment by \citet[experiment 1]{gao:2009_psychophysics}. Adults were shown a display which contained some moving circles. In some cases the circles moved independently of each other, but in other cases there was a ‘wolf’ which chased a ‘sheep’ with varying degrees of subtlety. The adults’ task was simply to detect the presence of a wolf. \citeauthor{gao:2009_psychophysics} established that adults can do this providing the chasing is not too subtle. In further experiments, they also showed that adults’ abilities to perceptually detect chasing depend on several cues including whether the chaser ‘faces’ its target (‘directionality’) and how directly the chaser approaches its target (‘subtlety’). The detection of animacy appears to be a broadly perceptual phenomena since it depends on areas of the brain associated with vision and influences how perceptual attention is allocated \citep{scholl:2013_perceiving} irrespective of your beliefs and intentions \citep{buren:2016_automaticity}.

Gao et al, 2009 figures 3b, 4a

[This comparison is a bit confused because pure-goal tracking is the kind of thing that can be (and is) achieved by way of different mechanisms (e.g. reasoning; motor processes), whereas perceptual animacy is a mechanism.]
pure goal-tracking perceptual animacy
What is tracked? actions & goals animate objects & targets
Computational description? Teleological Stance spatio-temporal heuristics
(e.g. subtlety, directionality)
Processes & representations? motoric perceptual
The perceptual detection of animacy resembles goal tracking, for it involves detecting a relation between a chaser and its target. However the perceptual detection of animacy is clearly distinct from goal tracking.% \footnote{% Contrast \citet{schlottmann:2010_goal,Scholl:2000eq} who all claim that perceptual animacy is a matter of, or involves, tracking goals. } For one thing, it involves detecting relations between objects in motion rather than outcomes to which actions are directed. Relatedly, it does not involve sensitivity to the type of action. Finally, the perceptual detection of animacy appears to depend on simple cues and heuristics and is unlikely to be correctly described by the Teleological Stance. For these reasons, we should distinguish the perceptual detection of animacy from tracking goals to which actions are directed.
To illustrate, we have to recognise that, in adults, there are multiple processes involved in tracking actions, which are differently affected by changes in context, and which probably have different affects on different kinds of responses to observed and anticipated actions.
Here is a rough guess about how things look IN ADULTS.

Motor Conjecture Revised

In 9-month-olds,

all pure goal-tracking is explained by the Motor Theory;

appearances that goal-tracking is not limited by their abilities to act are due to perceptual animacy.

Predictions

Where 9-month-olds appear to be tracking goals
in ways not limited by their abilities to act,
they will be subject to signature limits of perceptual animacy
(e.g. subtlety, directionality);

and the processes underlying their abilities will be broadly perceptual.

what’s already in infants ...
How does the conjecture help with the puzzles about development?

Puzzles

In infants under 10 months,
it appears that
some,
but not all,
goal-tracking is limited by their abilities to act ...

... and that goal-tracking sometimes manifests in dishabitution or pupil dilation but not proactive gaze.

The second puzzle was a dissociation between dishabituation and pupil dilation on the one hand and proactive gaze on the other. The conjecture I have formulated suggests a solution: perhaps perceptual animacy is sometimes responsible for pupil dilation and dishabituation; but never responsible for proactive gaze.
The first puzzle was the appearance of cases of goal-tracking in infancy which is not limited by infants’ abilities to act. The conjecture I have proposed suggests a solution to this too: those cases are underpinned by perceptual animacy and so not genuine cases of goal-tracking at all.

objection

Gao et al, 2009 figure 3b; Csibra et al 2003, figure 6

further complication: associative learning for sequencing

Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010

Pupil dilation at 6 and 12-months of age; unlike proactive gaze, it does not correlate with experience of being fed; but it isn’t plausibly perceptual animacy either. (Why would perceptual animacy predict a difference between spoon going to mouth or hand?) Instead it may be a consequence of associative learning about the typical sequence of chunks of actions.