Origins of Mind (Umeå):

The Question (001)

Introduces the question around which this module is organised

From Myths to Mechanisms (021)

A quick, scene-setting discussion of nativism and empiricism.

Two Breakthroughs (051)

Two scientific breakthroughs that have recently furthered understanding of how knowledge might emerge in development. The first breakthrough is the discovery that preverbal infants enjoy surprisingly rich social abilities, abilities which may well be foundational for later linguistic abilities and enable the emergence of knowledge (e.g. Csibra & Gergely 2009; Meltzoff 2007; Tomasello et al. 2005). A second breakthrough is the use of increasingly sensitive—-and sometimes controversial--methods to detect sophisticated expectations concerning causal interactions, numerosity, mental states and more besides in preverbal infants (e.g. Spelke 1990; Baillargeon et al. 2010).

Davidson’s Challenge (031)

There is an obstacle to understanding the emergence of knowledge in development. As Davidson (1999, 11) puts it, ‘We have many vocabularies for describing nature when we regard it as mindless and we have a mentalistic vocabulary for describing thought and intentional action what we lack is a way of describing what is in between’

Unperceived Objects: An Illustration of Davidon's Challenge (032)

objects habituation

We encounter Davidson's challenge in some form in every domain of knowlegde, including knowledge of objects.

Knowledge of Mind (401)

The challenge is to explain the emergence of awareness of others' mental states; here we focus on awareness of others' beliefs.

Infants Track False Beliefs (411)

Many behaviours exhibited by infants, including anticipatory looking, looking time, pointing and helping activities, show sensitivity to what others believe even when their beliefs are false.

Mindreading: a Developmental Puzzle (416)

The first puzzle concerns apparently conflicting findings about when and how humans acquire awareness of others' beliefs.

Mindreading Chimpanzees? (418)

Humans are probably not the only great apes which can track others’ beliefs (Krachun et al, 2009; Krupenye et al, 2017).

Minimal Theory of Mind (441)

The construction of a minimal theory of mind provides one explanation for how mindreading could be automatic in a limited but useful range of cases.

Signature Limits (451)

Minimal theory of mind has signature limits. These allow us to generate predictions to test conjectures about when mindreading involves minimal theory of mind.

Automatic Mindreading in Adults (421)

In adults, mindreading is sometimes entirely a consequence of relatively automatic processes and sometimes not. Further, automatic and nonautomatic mindreading processes are independent in this sense: different conditions influence whether they occur and which ascriptions they generate.

A Dual Process Theory of Mindreading (423)

In adults, mindreading is sometimes entirely a consequence of relatively automatic processes and sometimes not. Further, automatic and nonautomatic mindreading processes are independent in this sense: different conditions influence whether they occur and which ascriptions they generate.

Three Abilities to Underpin Knowledge of Objects (161)

Knowledge of objects requires abilities to (i) segment objects, (ii) represent them as persisting and (iii) track their interactions. What this involves can be illustrated by contrasting objects with features.

Segmentation and the Principles of Object Perception (171)

Humans, adult and infant, segment objects in accordance with four principles: cohension, boundedness, rigidity and no action at a distance (Spelke 1990).

Permanence (181)

There is evidence that abilities to represent unperceived objects as persisting appear early in infancy, from four months of age or earlier. It appears that a single set of principles might explain both abilities to represent objects as persisting and abilities to segment objects.

Causal Interactions (201)

Knowledge of objects requires being able to track their causal interactions. How do humans achieve this?

Recap and Questions (206)

A brief recap of what we've learnt so far about infant representations of objects and their causal interactions.

A Problem (207)

Some principles describe infants' abilities to segment and represent persisting physical objects and their causal interactions. What is the relation between these principles and the mechanisms of object perception? Are they, for example, things that infants know?

Like Knowledge and Like Not Knowledge (SHORTENED) (211)

There are principles of object perception that explain abilities to segment objects, to represent them while temporarily unperceived and to track their interactions. These principles are not known. What is their status?

The Problem with the Simple View: Summary (215)

The Simple View implies that infants’ abilities to segment physical objects, represent them as persisting and track their causal intereactions is a consequence of their having beliefs concerning physical objects. The Simple View must be rejected because it generates incorrect multiple predictions.

What Is Core Knowledge? (601_warwick)

What is core knowledge? Why do we need a notion of core knowledge? What is its relation to knowledge?

Objections to Core Knowledge (604_short)

What is core knowledge? Why do we need a notion of core knowledge? What is its relation to knowledge?

Core System vs Module (231)

How is the notion of a core system related to that of modularity? ?

The CLSTX Hypothesis: Object Indexes Underpin Infants’ Abilities (665)

How do four- and five-month-olds track briefly occluded objects? One hypothesis is that their abilities to do so depend on a system of object indexes like that which underpins multiple object tracking or object-specific preview benefits.

Core Knowledge vs Object Indexes (669)

Consider the conjecture that infants’ abilities concerning physical objects are characterised by the Principles of Object Perception because infants’ abilities are a consequence of the operations of a system of object indexes. If this conjecture is true, does it contradict claims that infants have a core system for physical objects?

Knowledge of Colour: a Question (110)

How does knowledge of simple facts about the categorical colour properties of things emergence in development? For example, how do humans first come to know that this thing is blue?

Categorical Perception of Colour (111)

Categorical perception is a pervasive and useful feature of human experience much neglected by philosophers despite illuminating psychological research on this topic. Here we focus on colour. The aim is initially just to understand what categorical perception is.

Categorical Perception in Infancy (121)

Categorical perception of colour emerges early in infancy, from around four months or earlier, as has been demonstrated using habituation (Bornstein, Kessen and Weiskopf 1976) and visual search tasks (Franklin, Pilling and Davies 2005).

Is Categorical Perception Core Knowledge? (133)

Categorical perception has some but not all of the features of core knowledge. Does it count as core knowledge?

Categorical Perception and Knowledge (131)

How is infants' categorical preception of colour related to adults' knowledge of colour?

Appendix: Categorical Perception in Infants and Adults (Optional) (141)

How are infants' and adults' categorical preception of colour related?

Crossing the Gap (690)

Having core knowledge of something does not involve having any knowledge knowledge at all. How do humans cross the gap from merely having core knowledge concerning some things to having knowledge proper of those things?

Action: When? (701)

When do human infants first track goal-directed actions and not just movements? A variety of evidence suggests that the answer is, from around three months. Is this competence is related to adults’ abilites to track goal-directed action? Is it a manifestation of core knowledge?

The Teleological Stance (702)

How do infants (and perhaps adults) identify the goals of observed actions? The leading, best developed proposal is Gergely and Csibra’s Teleological Stance.

A Limit on Goal Tracking in the First Nine Months (711)

How do infants (and perhaps adults) identify the goals of observed actions? The leading, best developed proposal is Gergely and Csibra’s Teleological Stance.

The Motor Theory of Goal Tracking (712)

How do infants (and perhaps adults) identify the goals of observed actions? The leading, best developed proposal is Gergely and Csibra’s Teleological Stance.

A Puzzle About Goal Tracking (713)

In infants under 10 months, it appears that some, but not all, goal-tracking is limited by their abilities to act.

Perceptual Animacy (714)

Perceptual animacy is the detection by broadly perceptual processes of animate objects and their targets.

Joint Action: The Challenge (801)

Joint action is arguably required to explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of human activity including, referential communication and mindreading.

What Is Joint Action? Bratman’s Account (811)

On the leading, best developed account of joint action (Bratman’s), joint action requires shared intention and shared intention requires mindreading abilities, including insight into others’ plans and intentions.

What Joint Action Could Not Be (821)

On Bratman’s account, performing a joint action requires shared intention and shared intention requires mindreading at close to the limits of what human adults are capable of. For this reason we cannot both accept that joint action plays a role in explaining how sophisticated human activities including mindreading emerge in development and that Bratman’s account specifies the relevant notion of joint action.

Development of Joint Action: Planning (831)

When are humans first able to do what Bratman calls ‘interconnected planning’?

Development of Joint Action: Years 1-2 (841)

What (if any) joint actions are humans capable of just at the point they are beginning to communicate referentially (typically around the first birthday)?

Collective Goals vs Shared Intentions (851)

The notion of a collective goal is key to understanding a notion of joint action that does not involve on shared intention. (An outcome is a collective goal of two or more actions involving multiple agents just if the actions are directed to this goal and this is not, or not just, a matter of each action being individually directed to that goal.)

Pointing (661)

From around 11 or 12 months of age infants spontaneously point to request, inform and initiate joint engagement. Here we examine evidence for this claim. We then ask, by contrasting humans with nonhuman primates, what is involved in producing and comprehending pointing.

Pointing: Reference and Context (662)

How 18- and 14-month-old infants interpret a pointing gesture depends on the cooperative context in which it occurs.

A Puzzle about Pointing (663)

Humans point in ways that no other animal does. Why? Also, humans first point to request, inform or initiate joint engagement months after they can produce pointing gestures. Why? (These questions are taken from Tomasello, Carpenter & Liszkowski.)

What is a communicative action? (671)

To understand what follows from infants' abilities to comprehend and produce pointing gestures, we need to ask what a communicative action is. One view hinges on shared intentionality, which is related to Grice's attempts to analyse meaning. Here we consider implications of that view and contrast it with two alternatives.

From Joint Action to Communication (746)

Syntax / Innateness (641)

Infants' abilties to detect syntactic structure are surprisingly sophisticated (relative to their performance in producing utterances). Here we consider a case study. We also use this case study to examine how poverty of stimulus arguments work. Some argue that infants have innate abilties to learn about syntax.

Conclusions and Questions (999)

What progress have we made in trying to understand how humans come to know about--and to knowingly manipulate--objects, causes, words, numbers, colours, actions and minds?